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Covert timing channels provide a mechanism to transmit unauthorized information across
different processes. It utilizes the inter-arrival times between the transmitted packets to hide the
communicated data. It can be exploited in a variety of malevolent scenarios such as leaking
military secrets, trade secrets, and other forms of Intellectual Property (IP). They can be also
used as a vehicle to attack existing computing systems to disseminate software viruses or worms
while bypassing firewalls, intrusion detection and protection systems, and application filters.
Therefore, the detection and mitigation of covert channels is a key issue in modern Information
Technology (IT) infrastructure. Many companies, countries and government agencies such as the
US government and the US military bodies, National Security Agency, US Air Force, and
National Computer Security Centre are focused on devising better techniques to detect and
potentially eliminate covert channels. This will serve as an important building block for a
decision support system that protects the IT infrastructure against such vulnerabilities.
This research introduces new solutions to detect and minimize the amount of data that is
potentially exchanged over covert timing channels. The main motivation behind employing the
hierarchical statistical analysis approach is to detect the existence of covert timing channel
irrespective of the time-scale within which it is concealed with respect to the overall data stream.
In addition, compared to flat statistical analysis which is usually utilized in this context, a

hierarchical statistical approach might give a more accurate indicator because it is applied on
different levels of the time-scales of the data stream. This is because more features are involved
in the analysis process such as means of data segments on different levels.
The massive data collected by decision support systems represent a perfect fuel for deep
learning approaches. While deep learning shows many success stories with massive data,
traditional analysis algorithms struggle even on high specs workstations. Developing an
algorithm to detect covert timing channels using deep learning makes this work different from
the others in the recent literature where the support vector machine is the main algorithm usually
evaluated with different sets of features. This study also minimizes the amount of information
that can be potentially exchanged over covert timing channels by attempting to mitigate the
covert timing channels. This proposed approach works by finding a good compromise between
eliminating the potential covert timing channels and the overall Quality of Service (QoS).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
In network communication, covert timing channels provide a mechanism to transmit
unauthorized information across different processes. It utilizes the inter-arrival times between the
transmitted packets to hide the communicated data. It can be exploited in a variety of malevolent
scenarios such as leaking military secrets, trade secrets, and other forms of Intellectual Property
(IP). They can also be used as a vehicle to attack existing computing systems to disseminate
software viruses or warms while bypassing firewalls, intrusion detection and protection systems,
and application filters. Therefore, the detection and mitigation of covert channels is a key issue
in modern Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. Many companies, countries and
government agencies such as the US government and the US military bodies, National Security
Agency, US Air Force, and National Computer Security Centre are focused on designing
frameworks and new models to increase the likelihood of detecting and potentially eliminating
covert channels. These will serve as building blocks for a decision support system that protects
the IT infrastructure against such vulnerabilities.
Figure 1.1 shows an example of covert inter-arrival-times among overt inter-arrivaltimes. In this example, the long inter-arrival times (0.7 ms and 0.9ms) represent a covert time
channel among overt inter-arrival times (0.2 ms, 0.3 ms and 0.4 ms).

Figure 1.1 Covert timing message.
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Such long inter-arrival times are considered as a fertile environment for leaking data and secure
information.
Covert Timing Channel Challenges
The detection of covert timing channels has always been a major challenge to overcome
for the research community. Approaches attempting to detect the hidden messages within the
communicated data can be broadly classified into two categories: flat statistical analysis based,
and pattern recognition based solutions. One of the most popular techniques is the entropy
analysis measure. Entropy or (flat entropy) value describes how much data are patterned in a
specific data stream. The highest the value of the entropy is, the lowest the data possible to be
patterned [1]. Prior work using statistical based approaches mostly considered flat analysis, in
the sense that all metrics are calculated on the entire stream in a single pass. In this dissertation,
we propose adopting a different approach consisting of hierarchical entropy analysis approach to
detect the existence of covert timing channel.
This is our first contribution and will be described in details in Chapter 2. Proposed
solutions to the covert channel detection problem are usually executed on a very large dataset.
This has added more performance constraints on acceptable solutions in terms of Execution time.
The last is considered the second major challenge to overcome during the detection process. In
this dissertation, we propose using the MapReduce framework along with the hierarchical
entropy analysis to cope with the large data size we have in hand and improve the performance
of the covert channel detection step. To the best of our knowledge, the benefits of MapReduce in
the detection of covert timing channels has not been investigated in the literature. This is our
second contribution and will be described further in Chapter 3.
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The next major challenge with this type of problems is to improve the accuracy of the
proposed solutions. Our main motivation behind employing the hierarchical statistical analysis
approach is to detect the existence of covert timing channel irrespective of the time-scale within
which it is concealed with respect to the overall data stream. In addition, compared to flat
statistical analysis, which is usually utilized in this context, hierarchical statistical approach
might give an accurate indicator because it is applied on different levels of the time-scales of the
data stream. This is because more features get involved in the analysis process such as the mean
of data segments on different levels. On the other side, the massive data collected by decision
support systems represent a perfect fuel to the deep learning approaches. While deep learning
shows many success stories with massive data, traditional analysis algorithms struggle even on
high specs workstations. Developing an algorithm to detect covert timing channels using deep
learning makes this work different from the others in the recent literature where support vector
machine is the main algorithm usually evaluated with different sets of features [2]. This is our
third contribution and will be described further in Chapter 4.
Solutions to covert timing channels attempted to mitigate (eliminate) the malicious covert
channels without affecting the overall data transfer Quality of Service. This is considered the
next challenge that we propose to overcome in this dissertation. We propose a new online
streaming approach to mitigate covert timing channels with no potential disruption on the
transferred data and while preserving a good Quality of Service (QoS). This is our fourth major
contribution and will be presented in Chapter 5.
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Dissertation Contribution Summary
My dissertation focuses broadly on the detection and mitigation of the covert timing
channels. The main contributions are the following:
1. Develop a simulator for covert timing channels generation. The output of this step is a
huge dataset of both covert and overt timing channels inter-arrivals times of size close to
6M record. We propose posting our dataset to one of the existing machine learning
repository for the research community to experiment and compare results.
2. Design a Hierarchical Entropy algorithm. The algorithm divides the inter-arrival times
into binary sub groups at different levels and extracts the lowest entropy value by a
Greedy way.
3. Use MapReduce and hierarchical entropy analysis to speed-up the detection of covert
timing channels. The proposed approach could be applied to any traffic collected from
suspicious applications or network flows.
4. Propose a new hierarchical based statistical analysis for covert timing channels detection.
Five metrics will be considered during the analysis: mean, median, standard deviation,
RAME, and entropy. The goal of this step is to give an accurate indicator about covert
timing channels, because it is applied on different levels of the time-scales of the data
stream.
5. Use deep neural network techniques for large data classification and improved time
complexity. In addition, we demonstrate that our all-together approach (hierarchical
statistical analysis alongside with deep neural network model) achieves high accuracy
results compared to SVM based approach. This model aims at overcoming the
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weaknesses of existing statistical flat based analysis techniques and SVM long model
training time for large data application.
6. Minimize the amount of information that can be potentially exchanged over covert timing
channels by attempting to mitigate the covert timing channels. Our proposed approach
works by finding a good compromise between eliminating the potential covert timing
channels and the overall Quality of Service (QoS).
Dissertation Organization
Chapter 1 of this dissertation explores two main contributions. The first one is the design
of the developed simulator for covert timing channels. The second one is the efficiency of
hierarchical entropy analysis algorithm in detecting covert timing channels comparing to the
traditional flat entropy analysis.
Chapter 2 aims at improving the time complexity of the hierarchical entropy analysis
algorithm using the well-known big data technique MapReduce. Add to that, it will compare the
efficiency of the MapReduce approach to the classical hierarchical entropy approach in term of
speed detection.
Chapter 3 introduces a new hierarchal metrics such as mean, median, standard deviation,
and root of average mean error beside the hierarchal entropy metric. It will also highlight the
effect of these metrics in the detection of covert timing channels process. On the other hand, it
will express the utilization of deep neural network to handle the huge data in this problem.
Finally, it will conduct a comparison between deep neural network and support vector machine
with its different known kernels in terms of accuracy of detection and the time of building the
model as well.

5

Chapter 4 jumps to the idea of mitigating covert timing channels and destroying the
existence of such channels. In this chapter we did not focus on the detection of covert timing but
how to prevent the future detection of such type of channels.
Chapter 5 presents an overall conclusion, as well as the major contributions of this work
and outlines the future trajectory of our research work.
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CHAPTER 2
PAPER ONE: THE ROLE OF HIERARCHICAL ENTROPY ANALYSIS IN
DETECTION AND TIME-SCALE DETERMINATION OF
COVERT TIMING CHANNELS
Abstract
This paper introduces the hierarchal entropy vs. flat entropy in terms of covert timing
channel exploration and time-scale determination. A data transmission framework is built to
simulate the covert timing behavior, detect its existence and identify the location of such type of
channels. Hierarchical entropy divides the inter-arrival times stream into Grady binary manner
upon the lowest entropy values. The lowest entropy is a good indicator to identify patterns in
data streams. The results show that hierarchal entropy is significant in detecting covert timing
channel in comparing with the flat one. The simulation results are obtained without any distance
or location measurements devices.
Introduction
Data transmission in secure manner is a very important issue for any distributed network
system [3]. Data packets travel from sender to receiver through network channels [4]. The
channels in network are categorized into overt and covert channels[5]. In overt channels the
communication between sender and receiver occurs under authorized path [6]. Covert channels
transmit the data in unauthorized manner[7]. The data in covert channels are hidden illegally [8].
It’s considered as a violation of security rules to leak sensitive data between sender and receiver
[9][10]. The main difference between a covert and an overt channel is the authorization issue.
Covert channels are set to be either of type storage or timing channels. Storage channels use the
memory packet itself to leak the information, while covert timing channels use the inter-arrival
times between the transmitted packets[11]. Extra bytes, in ICMP error packets, to till the
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operating system type are an example of storage channels [12]. A transmission of secret binary
data upon inter-arrival times is an example of covert timing channel. Figure 2.1 shows an
example of a binary message hidden in the inter-arrival time between different packets.

Figure 2.1 Example of a binary message hidden in the inter-arrival time between different packets.

Covert timing channels have many applications in real life scenarios such as passing
secret messages for military issues and intrusion attacks (viruses, worms, and different hacking
types) [13].
Detection and exploration of covert timing channels is a key issue in the security field.
Many respected organizations invest in this field such as USA government and USA military
bodies [13]: National security agency [14], US Air Force [15], and National Computer Security
Centre [9][16].
The detection of covert timing channels is covered by different statistical and pattern
recognition techniques. One of the most popular techniques is the entropy analysis measure.
Entropy or (flat entropy) value describes how much data are patterned in a specific data stream.
The highest the value of the entropy is the lowest the data possible to be patterned [1]. This paper
presents the Hierarchical entropy analysis as a most efficient approach to detect covert timing
channels. It divides the inter-arrival times into binary sub groups at different levels and extracts
the lowest entropy value by a Grady way. The goal of the hierarchical entropy analysis is to
detect the existence of covert timing channel even if it’s affected by noisy factors. Flat entropy
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may not give an accurate indicator as the hierarchical entropy because it is applied on the entire
data stream.
The rest of this paper is structured as the following: section II discusses the literature
review, section III describes data transmission framework which simulate the covert timing
channels behavior, section IV describes time-scale determination of covert timing channel using
entropy analysis and hierarchical entropy algorithm Section V shows the results and experiments
for this research, and finally section VI conclude this paper.
Literature Review
Covert channel as a concept is introduced by Lampson in 1973 [17][18]. One of the
earlier papers that introduced covert timing channel was in 1978 by Padlipsky [19]. He generated
a simple binary covert timing channel by either send a message or keeps silent for particular
time. If the packet received this mean one value otherwise it means zero [19],[20][21]. A covert
channel in LAN’s presented by Girling in 1987 describes the covert timing channel in simple
way where the odd inter-arrival time set to be zero and the even one set to be one [22]. Reducing
Fuzzy Covert Timing Channels is proposed by Hu in 1991. It describes a new technique in
covert timing channel. The authors categorize covert timing channel into software that depends
on CPU time and hardware that depends on two main factors, which are the traffic and
bandwidth. If the sender intends to send a bit with one value, it will be generated by a sequence
of instructions, which needs traffic such as memory reference, but for zero bit the sender avoid
the traffic instructions [23]. IP covert timing channels design and detection is a paper introduced
by Cabuk in 2004. It depends on encoding the files on bits scheme and sends it according to the
inter-arrival times. Parity pits are added to maintain the corrupted data and the files already
encrypted by one of decoding techniques in the receiver side. Detecting covert timing channels
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based on regularity is explored in the same paper. The main idea of deduction depends on the
standard deviation for a sequence of inter-arrival times. Low standard deviation is an indicator of
a high regularity in inter-arrival stream and more possibility of covert timing channel [24]. A
Model-based covert timing channel is introduced by Steven Gianvecchio in 2008. The main idea
behind the model is to analyze the inter-arrivals time between packets and assign symbols for
those arrival times upon random based equation. The symbols can be decoded again in the
receiver side by another mathematical formula [11]. Hide and seek in time robust covert timing
channels are suggested by Liu in 2009. The paper explained a new equation to hide the regularity
in covert timing channels. The equation makes it harder to detect covert timing channels. It
mainly depends on two main factors which are variance and covariance parameters [25].
Entropy test score is presented by Steven and Wang in 2011. Low entropy means low
randomization and high possibility of covert timing channel [26]. Using covert timing channels
for attack detection in MANETs is suggested by Jonathan in 2012. The main idea is to map a
symbol in multiple bits and assign it to particular jitter value. The XOR is used to encrypt the
sender message before sending it through the covert timing channel [27] . Bakeoff algorithms as
covert timing channel in distributed system are described by Radhakrishnan in 2013 [28]. In
2014 Shrestha, P.L. et al suggested an event-based model to represent the covert timing channel.
It focuses on the capacity of the covert timing channel and others main features such as packet
loses and network jitter noises [29]. The desynchronization problem and other Cabuk algorithm
disadvantages are discussed by the Delayed Packet One Indicator algorithm (DPOI), which
introduced in 2014. DPOI grantees the all covert information delivered by inter-arrival times
rather than packet’s storage [30].
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Covert Timing Simulator
Actually, when we started working on this research, we explored the literature to find a
dataset with both covert and overt timing channels inter-arrivals time but unfortunately we didn’t
find any. In addition, there is no simulator that generates both types of covert and overt timing
channels. The next step was to build our own Covert timing simulator in order to obtain the
behavior of covert and overt timing channels. The simulator is a set of units, which describes the
process of leaking hidden data through the inter-arrival times between a sender and a receiver. In
the sender side, the simulator generates the covert message by reading text files. Each file
contains a set of characters that represent the covert message. The message’s characters are
transformed into binary code and the binary code is encoded to guarantee the recovery from
errors in the receiver side. The binary bits are mapped into different inter-arrival times and
finally send to the receiver. In the receiver side, the inter-arrival times between packets are
detected and transformed into binary bits. The binary bits are encoded again and recovered into
characters mode to get the original message, which is the encoded text files.
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Figure 2.2 Covert timing channel simulator.

The simulator in Figure 2.2 shows the six integrated units, which are:
A. Generating binary message
The unit reads the text file from a repository of text files. All of the text files are
generated randomly using the algorithm, which is presented in Figure 2.3.
Generate random text_length
Do
Get random ASCII
Convert the ASCII to symbol
Write the symbol into text_file
Until text_length !=0
Figure 2.3 Generating binary message

The algorithm shows that the text length is generated randomly and the symbols inside
each text file are also randomly picked. Each file represents the covert message. The output of
this unit is a binary message obtained from the text file’s characters.
12

B. Encoding binary message
The input for this unit is the generated binary message. The message is encoded by Bose–
Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem (BCH) encoding technique. In BCH, the message size is duplicated by
adding a new group of bits which support the recovery operation in the receiver side.

BCH

function is already implemented in Octave.
C. Mapping into inter-arrival times
The bits in the encoded message are mapped into different inter-arrival times by randombased equation. The equation for Covert channel is:
𝑋 =𝑆+1+𝐵∗𝑉

Where:
X is the mapped inter-arrival time.
S is the number of mapped bits of size b bits. The domain of S is varied between 0 to2! .
For example if we choose to encode using two bits (b=2) that means S has a domain between 0
to 3 as the following 00, 01, 10, and 11.
B is a positive integer uniform random value.
V is a real ratio uniform random value.
Both of B and V are responsible to generate a valid and acceptable inter-arrival time.
For overt Channel the equation doesn’t have S so it is completely random.
X = Random (µ, ∑) Where:
X is a normal random number with µ mean and ∑ standard deviation
D. Mapping into binary code
In the receiver side the covered inter-arrival times are detected and converted into binary
code upon the following equation:
𝑆 =𝑋−1−𝐵∗𝑉
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E. Decoding by BCH
The binary code in the previous message is decoded by the BCH decoding technique and
some bit errors are recovered.
F. The last step is to recover the original text message into the characters mode
The quality of the covert timing channel in this simulator is determined by the ratio
between the numbers of recovered characters in the receiver side to the number of the original
characters in the sender side. The recovered characters should be the same as in the sender side
and in the right order. Noises in the transmission channel play a significant role in term of covert
timing channel quality. The highest is the Noise, the lowest is the quality. No doubt that noise
can affect the transmitted inter-arrival times which is considered as the backbone of covert
timing channel.
Time-Scale Determination of Covert Timing Channel Using Entropy Analysis and
Hierarchical Entropy Algorithm
This section explains in details how the hierarchical entropy algorithm works to detect
the covert timing channel. Mathematically, the entropy equation is:
!

Entropy X = −

P(i)log (P i )
!!!

Where X is the stream of inter-arrival times, and P(i) is the probability of i item in the
inter-arrival times stream.
The algorithm process starts by dividing the inter-arrival times into two sub array
recursively until either the number of elements doesn’t exceed small number of elements or the
algorithm reaches a point where the difference of entropy between the previous level and the
new level exceeds a specific threshold value. The stream for a new level is picked by a greedy
manner upon the smallest entropy value among both of them. As soon as we get the gap between
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any two layers, a covert timing channel is announced. Otherwise there is no covert on the stream
and we can say that is completely overt. Figure 2.4 illustrates a simple example where the
variance of entropy between level 0 and level 1 equals 0.35 after we pick the right stream for the
next level since it has lower entropy value compare to the right one. If the threshold for example
is 0.20 which means that the variance exceeds it and the covert exists and started from index 4.

Figure 2.4 Time-scale determination of the covert timing channel.

As mentioned before the least entropy is an indicator of where is the pattern could be
found. The complexity of hierarchical entropy algorithm is O(log (n)) where n is length of interarrival sequence. Figure 2.5 shows the psedocode of the hierarchical entropy algorithm in details.
The Flag variable is to announce the existing of a covert timing channel as soon as deducted on
the stream. The initial_Entropy variable holds the entropy value of the previous level and the
new_ Entropy holds the entropy of the current level. The variance variable holds the difference
between the initial_Entropy and the new_ Entropy. If this variance exceeds a specific threshold,
then we can determine the existing of covert trimming channel. This threshold can be determined
by training the system on a set of different streams, which already has covert timing channel. The
index variable shows where the started position of covert timing channel on the stream is. The
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last level upon this algorithm has just four items after that there is no significant meaning for
entropy on detecting covert timing channels.
Index=0;
Flag=False
Initial_Entropy=Entropy (inter-arrival_stream)
Do
Divide the inter-arrival_stream into two equal sub streams L,
R
If (Entropy (L)<=Entropy(R))
new_Entropy=Entropy (L)
Index=Index
inter-arrival_stream= L
Else
new_Entropy=Entropy (R)
Index=Index+length (R)
inter-arrival_stream= L
End If
Variance=initial_Entropy-new_Entropy
If (variance>= threshold)
Print “Covert time channel has been detected on
Index”:Index
Flag=True
Exit
Else
initial_Entropy=new_Entropy
End If
While (size of stream>=4)
If (Flag==False)
Print “No covert time channel detected”

Figure 2.5 Hierarchical entropy algorithm.

Results
We ran the simulator to generate the covert and overt timing channel upon the
environment parameters in Table 2.1. We obtained 1500 tuples and built three datasets, which
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categorized upon encoding types (2, 4, and 6 bit). Each dataset has 500 tuples where 250 tuples
are covert and 250 tuples are overt.
Table 2.1 Environment parameters

Based on Time-Scale Determination we set an equation to qualify the accuracy of any
level in detection covert channel stream the equation is:
𝑄! =

𝐶! 𝐿! − 𝐶!
−
𝐶
𝐿!

Ql is the quality of Level l in detection covert channel, Cl is the covert detected at level l,
Ls is the level size, C is the all existed covert trimming channel in the stream. The maximum
quality of level is 1 which means all the covert existed on the stream is completely fit at that
level. The lowest value of covert timing channel is -1 which means there is no any covert
detected at that level. Negative values mean that the amount of inter-arrival times, which are not
related to the covert channel exceeded the amount of that related to the covert channel. Figure
2.6 shows the quality of levels based upon the above equation.
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Figure 2.6 Quality of level.

Figure 2.6 shows that for 2 bit encoding level 128 sizes was the best level to detect covert
timing channel and 64 for the 4 bit encoding but for 6 bit we may say 256 but actually it has a lot
of irrelevant covert inside. 6 bit encoding means that the randomness of covert channel is very
high and it’s very hard to detect. Figure 2.7 shows the ratio of the covert timing channel in each
level.
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Figure 2.7 Ratio of covert timing in each level with different type of encodings.

In order to obtain the approximation value of threshold we train the algorithm on 66% of
tuples for each dataset, which is around 330 tuples. Table 2.2 shows the approximated threshold
value for each dataset.
Table 2.2 Approximated threshold value for each dataset

19

Threshold value is increased as the encoding value decreased since the inter-arrival times
values will be more repeated and the covert will be very clear also and that will make the big gap
between entropy values.
After that we run the algorithm on the remaining 170 tuples as testing for the algorithm
and the results shows that the highest accuracy is obtained on the 2 bit encoding dataset and it
was the worst on the 6 bit encoding dataset. 85 tuples of each testing dataset are covert and the
other is overt. The following table shows in details the accuracy of the hierarchical entropy vs.
flat Entropy on detecting the covert timing channel on different streams of inter-arrival times
with different encoding number of bits which are 2bit, 4 bit and 6 bit. For the flat entropy we
train the model on the same number of tuples for each dataset and calculate the mean value of
flat inter-arrival time’s entropy as a threshold to determine if the stream is covert or overt. If the
flat entropy is less than the threshold it means covet otherwise overt.
Table 2.3 The accuracy of the hierarchical entropy on detecting the covert timing channel

The testing results show also how many tuples are detected as covert on each level for
each dataset.
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Table 2.4 Detected covert timing on different levels

The results show that it is identical with quality levels on figure 2.6 where the best level
for dataset with encoding 2 is level 128 and 4 bit is 64 which is the same as that appeared on
Figure 2.6. But again for 6 bit dataset the quality will not be clear because there are a lot of errors
on deducting the covert timing channel.
The following figure shows the trend of covert variance between entropy on different
levels.

Figure 2.8 Variance between entropy on different levels for covert timing channels.

The gaps are very clear between levels on different datasets encoding. The following figure
shows the trend of overt variance between entropy on different levels.
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Figure 2.9 Variance between entropy on different levels for overt timing channels.

It is clear that there is no any significant gap on the overt channel streams.
Conclusion and Future Work
The paper introduces hierarchical entropy algorithm as a new approach to detect covert
timing channel and determine where it exist. The main idea depends on the gap between the
variance of different entropies. We also introduce an equation to calculate the quality of the level
depends on how much it has a pure covert channel. The results show that hierarchical entropy
algorithm get a high accuracy on detecting covert timing channel with dataset encoded by 2 bit
and 4 bit which are around 96% and 84% respectively. We are looking to apply the big data
analysis techniques in the huge data generated by the simulator and applying the hierarchical
entropy algorithm into more different environments such as the social networks to check the
efficiency of the algorithm in detecting patterns in such type of environments.
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CHAPTER 3
PAPER TWO: USING MAPREDUCE AND HIERARCHICAL ENTROPY ANALYSIS
TO SPEED-UP THE DETECTION OF
COVERT TIMING CHANNELS
Abstract
Covert timing channels provide a mechanism to transmit unauthorized information across
different processes. Applications that generate large datasets allow this information to be easily
hidden within the big data, making it difficult to detect. In this paper, we introduce the
application of big data analysis techniques, specifically MapReduce, in the process of speeding
up the performance of covert time channels detection. The hierarchal entropy algorithm (HEA) is
utilized to reveal a “needle” of covert timing channels from a huge “haystack” of inter-arrival
times. A real indexed inter-arrival dataset of approximately 1.4 gigabyte is generated between
two different machines and injected by 615 bytes of covert timing message. The HEA with
MapReduce was able to uncover around 7*10-6 of hidden covert message from this huge amount
of data in a significantly shorter time as compared to the classical sequential HEA.
Introduction
With the tremendous surge of global data, big data is becoming a major topic and the
focus of modern science and business. Big data has the following 3 main features, known as
“3V’s”: (1) Varity – referring to the data types; whether it is structured, semi-structured, or
unstructured, (2) Velocity – referring to the data processing time; an important factor in decision
making, and (3) Volume – referring to the data size, which has already crossed the Zettabyte size
with some applications [31].
Big data is produced as a result of search queries, social networking, sensors reporting,
emails exchange, audio/video/images sharing, etc., and brings new challenges to the research
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community. These challenges include data storage, data analysis, data processing, data
visualization, and data security. The last is becoming vital for most of the industrial and
governmental organizations due to the sensitivity and confidentiality of some of the data from
one side, and the sophisticated hacking approaches and techniques used by malicious entities.
Data hiding is one of the existing possible techniques attempted by malicious entities, which has
proven its effectiveness in leaking or passing information. Covert channels are considered among
the popular techniques serving this purpose [32].
In network communications between a sender and a receiver, channels can either be overt
or covert. Overt channels are considered safe since only legitimate data is being transmitted in
the packets’ payload field. However, Covert channels attempt to hide the fact that a
communication is taking place between two Entities. Covert channels can be classified into two
categories based on the shared resources allowing the communication. They can either be storage
based channels, which depend on the packet fields itself [33] or timing based channels, which
depend on the inter-arrival times between packets and appears as a pattern inside the overt interarrival times [23].
Covert timing channels are generated with a very large set of inter-arrival times making
this application a good example of big data with the following two challenges: (1) design a high
performance framework to analyze and process the data, and (2) detect existing patterns enabling
the identification of malicious users, unlawful data exchange.
In the literature, many parallel processing frameworks were designed to cope with large
data. MapReduce, Spark and Storm are examples of such frameworks [34]. MapReduce is an
efficient technique established by Google to deal with big datasets especially if it does not fit in
the machine’s main memory. A MapReduce cluster is a group of processing nodes working
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together on a given problem. It has two main operations: the map step, which applies the map
function such as min and max on each chunk of data before sending it to the reducers; and the
reducer step, which summarizes all the mapper results to get the final output [35].
In our work, we aim at speeding up the detection of covert timing channels among
extremely huge overt time series dataset. This problem is similar to detecting a needle in a
haystack problem, where the needle is the covert timing channel and the haystack is the overt
timing channel. Our goal is to monitor the traffic between processes and predict the malicious
ones. We propose using a MapReduce technique as a solution in our attempt to speeding up the
process of uncovering these covert timing channels from a real and large dataset generated in our
local lab. Our MapReduce based approach along with the hierarchal entropy algorithm is used to
detect the covert timing channels. The approach is applicable to any traffic collected from
suspicious applications or network flows.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin section II with an
overview of some of the related work. Then in section III we describe the overall structure of the
real application environment we built to generate the dataset and evaluate our proposed
approach. The section also describes the details of our proposed approach for the time-scale
determination of covert timing channels using hierarchical entropy analyses based on
MapReduce. In Section IV we provide discussions of our results. Finally, section V we present
our concluding remarks and future research work.
Related Work and Motivation
The MapReduce algorithm is used to efficiently handle large datasets for various
applications. For instance, in [36], the authors utilized this technique for mining frequent patterns
residing in a big data file. The big data file was divided into many sub files and MapReduce was
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applied to discover frequent patterns before starting the mining process. In a different application
domain [37], the same approach was applied to mine uncertain big data (e.g., the prediction of a
storm with 20% of hail or 70% of tornado). The search space was reduced based on the user
specified constraints prior to the start of the MapReduce step.
Few previous works have also investigated the exploration of a needle in haystack
problem. In [38], the authors designed an approach for predicting vulnerabilities in a commercial
operating system (Vista). In this context, matching of a map in a very large database was
rendered as needle in haystack. The authors utilized the concept of software metrics and focused
on transforming the database using the coordinates offset. In [39], the authors considered
detecting critical alarms from wearable body sensors. Out of a large number of alarms
(haystack), the critical ones (dangerous for body) are considered as the needle. However, the
major focus of this work was related to solving such a problem on cloud servers instead of local
mobiles.
Covert timing channel detection has also received attention in the literature. The authors
in [2] designed a framework to detect covert timing channels based on a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier. Similarly, the authors in [40] designed a covert time channel based on Skype
traffic. In [41], the authors focused on detecting covert timing channels based on the idea of
reproducing the time of program execution. In our previous works [42], we implemented a
simulator for covert timing channel and designed the hierarchal entropy algorithm to detect
covert timing channel based on entropy analysis. Finally, a full analysis of all methods utilizing
HTTP messages in covert timing channels and their corresponding detection mechanisms have
been conducted and presented in [43].
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To the best of our knowledge, the benefits of MapReduce in the detection of covert
timing channels have not been investigated in the literature. Different from our previous work,
this paper considers efficient detection of covert timing channels using a combination of the
hierarchical entropy algorithm and the MapReduce framework.
In our work, we propose dividing our raw data into a set of chunks and apply the
hierarchal entropy algorithm as a map function to each chunk. The result of the map function is
the index of the first element in the subsequence with the least entropy and the value of entropy
in the same subsequence. All map function results are delivered to the reducers where each
reducer summarizes the mapper results until the index of the first element in that subsequence
chunk with the least entropy value indicates less randomness in data and a possibility of pattern
existence. Patterns in this context represent covert timing channels.
In the next section, we describe the architecture of the proposed framework for covert
timing channel detection.
Framework Architecture
Our proposed framework for detecting covert timing channels brings major
improvements in the following areas: (1) Reliability – it detects covert timing channels with a
high success rate, (2) Performance – It speeds up the computation process by using the
MapReduce technique along with the hierarchical entropy algorithm.
The proposed framework consists of three major blocks as depicted in Figure 3.1. These
blocks are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 3.1 Framework architecture.

A. Raw data generation
This phase consists of generating a large set of covert inter-arrivals times. The process
starts with encoding the covert text message using the same encoding scheme presented in [14].
With this approach, messages are encoded with 4 digits (ranging between [0-3]), or with 16
digits (ranging between [0-15]) or with 64 digits (ranging between [0-63]). The encoded message
is then injected on a stream of traffic between a sender and a receiver PC’s. The data transfer
procedure follows the following 3-step protocol.
Step1. The sender reads the encoded message one digit at a time adds 1 for each number
then multiplies it by a predefined slot of time. This computed number represents the amount of
time that the message should be buffered before being transmitted. During this step, it is worth
noting that “1” was added to ensure that there is no zero wait time for the “0” digit.
Step2. The sender waits the amount of wait time calculated in step 1 before initiating the
transmission.
Step3. The receiver monitors the inter-arrival time between incoming packets using the
Wireshark tool then generates the original data message and detects covert timing channels.
It is important to note that during this data generating setup, all inter-arrival times are
indexed to make parallel analyses easier for detecting the covert timing channel.
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B. Data preprocessing phase
This step is crucial in the whole detection process. It aims at overcoming the unavoidable
noise encountered during entities’ communications across the network causing a large variation
in the inter-arrival times. Without preprocessing, the hierarchical entropy algorithm
underperforms and fails to properly detect the regions of interest.
The first step of this process consists of calculating the average of all the inter-arrival
times (overt and covert). Since the inter-arrival times for the covert messages are small values, it
will have a minor effect on the overall inter-arrival times average. The next step entails checking
each inter-arrival time. Two cases are possible: if it is higher than the average, then it will be set
to zero; otherwise it will be assigned a unique number. This preprocessing phase guarantees a
pattern of “0’s”which is easier to detect during the entropy analysis. Figure 3.2 captures a sketch
of the preprocessing phase algorithm.
avg ← Compute the average inter-arrival times (τi):
for each inter-arrival time τi
{
if τi > avg
τi ← 0
else
τi ← new_index
}

Figure 3.2 Preprocessing phase algorithm.

In this example, the “0’s” are the values of interest and can be easily detected using the
hierarchal entropy algorithm.
C. Dataset analysis phase
This phase was designed with two main goals: (1) the detection of the covert timing
messages, and (2) the efficient execution of the detection step. The detection is guaranteed with
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the use of the hierarchal entropy algorithm (HEA) [14] on the preprocessed dataset, however the
efficiency of execution is guaranteed when adopting a MapReduce based approach during the
execution of the HEA.
Initially, the processed dataset is divided into chunks on which the entropy algorithm is
applied. For each chunk of data, the output of the HEA is the index of the first element in the
subsequence which has the least entropy, which will be communicated to the reducer. In the last
stage, the reducer will get the final answer which is the starting index of the least entropy in the
whole dataset indicating covert timing channel location index. During this “map” and “reduce”
process, one could face a compatibility issue in the chunk size concept between hardware and
software: Chunks for the hardware depend on the memory size whereas for the software it
depends on the records. This incompatibility could be easily resolved by filling the incomplete
chunks with sequential numbers. This should not affect the entropy value. This MapReduce
phase is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The idea behind the HEA is to keep looking for the region of lowest entropy by dividing
the inter-arrival time sequence into two sub-sequences and moving in a greedy manner toward
the subsequence with lowest entropy. The algorithm stops when either of these conditions are
met: there is no more difference in the entropy values, or at a certain predefined threshold
limiting the size of the sub-sequence. The output of the hierarchal entropy algorithm is the first
index in inter-arrival time in the sub-sequence and the entropy value at that sub-sequence.

30

Chunk N+1
Least Entropy,
Index

Mapper

Least Entropy,
Index

Chunk N
Least Entropy,

Reducer

Least Entropy,
Index

Least Entropy,
Index

Mapper

Least Entropy,
Index

Chunk 4

Chunk 3
Least Entropy,
Index

Mapper

Least Entropy,
Index

Least Entropy,
Index

Chunk 2

Chunk 1

Applying HEA
on each Chunk

Figure 3.3 The process of MapReduce phase.

Performance Results
In this sub-section, we present our experimental setup, results and analyze the obtained
results
A. Experimental setup
We evaluated the efficiency of the proposed MapReduce based HEA, in an environment
comprising two connected PCs’. The covert message which is being hidden is “It is a very secret
password. Please t.c.” The size of such message with respect to inter-arrival times is 2.5 KB,
which is way higher than the smallest message size that can be detected (615 bytes equivalent to
a word such as “car”). To generate the dataset, we monitor the inter-arrival times in the receiver
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side using the Wireshark tool. All the inter-arrival times are indexed in order to make the parallel
analysis process easier for detecting the covert timing channel. 1.4 gigabyte of inter-arrival times
is generated, indexed and saved in a text file.
We analyzed the performance of our approach in terms of the following metrics: (1)
Accuracy of the covert timing channel detection, and (2) Detection speed of the covert timing
channel. Our results are detailed in the following sub-section.
B. Results
a) Accuracy with respect to the encoding scheme.
Figure 3.4 shows the accuracy of the covert timing channel detection with different
number of encoding digits (4, 16, and 64 bits). The sender delay time is also varied from 100 µs
to 1000 µs. Results show that the accuracy is increased with an increase in sender delay time.
Moreover, a slight increase in the accuracy is observed as we increase the number of encoding
digits. Particularly, when the number of encoding digits is 64, the accuracy at a delay time of 100
µs, 500 µs and 1000 µs is 50%, 92%, and 99%, respectively. Similarly, as the number of
encoding digits increases from 4 to 64, the accuracy rises by 7-15%. The reason for the accuracy
increase is attributed to the covert time becoming more separated from the overt channel and
hence becomes easier to uncover at the receiver side.
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Figure 3.4 Detection accuracy with respect to the encoding scheme.

b) Detection speed for small dataset size
In this experiment, we compare the detection speed of sequential HEA and MapReduce
based HEA using 3 and 6 processors. These are shown in Figure 3.5. While the sequential
execution results in a lower detection time at lower dataset sizes, the MapReduce technique
outperforms the sequential execution at dataset sizes of greater than 658 KB. As the dataset size
further grows beyond 658 KB, the reduction in detection time using MapReduce is significant,
reaching up to about 6 seconds at a dataset size of 1.3 MB. This improvement is attributed to the
parallel execution of the huge dataset among several processors. The mapping approach
guarantees higher utilization for all available processors and hence, more efficient workload
distribution. On the other hand, in case of small data size, a higher detection time is due to the
high overhead instigated by the extra time needed to divide the data between processors as well
as processors’ communications time to exchange results.
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Figure 3.5 Sequential vs. .MapReduce.

c) Detection speed for large dataset size
In this experiment, we study the impact of increasing the number of processors on the
detection speed for a large dataset. Figure 3.6 shows that the increase in the number of
processors starts to be a factor only when the dataset size crosses the 83MB. Results show that
for a 1.4GB data size, the detection time for MapReduce based approach with 6 processors is 600
seconds lower than that with 3 processors, resulting in 100% improvement.
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Figure 3.6 Processing time vs. dataset size using 3 and 6 processors.

d) Accuracy of detection when using different encoding schemes
In this experiment, we study the effect of the buffering time (i.e., the delay time of
packets prior to sending them) and the encoding scheme (2, 4, or 6 bits) on the accuracy of
detecting covert timing channels. Results are captured in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. For the 2-bit
encoding case (Figure 3.7), the percentage of covert timing channel detection is 0 at inter-arrival
times of 100 covert timing channel length (i.e., the number of inter-arrival times included in the
covert timing message) and 250 covert timing channel length. This is because at lower number of
inter-arrival times, it is not possible to distinguish covert timing channels. At an inter-arrival time
of 500 covert timing channel length, the accuracy of detection is 0 using a buffering time of
20µs. As the buffering time is increased, the percentage of detection improves reaching up to
100% once the buffering time goes beyond 50µs. Figure 3.8 reports the results of the 4-bit
encoding case. It is still not possible to detect covert timing channels with inter-arrival time of
100 covert timing channel length. However, for an inter-arrival time of 250 covert timing
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channel lengths, the detection becomes possible for buffering time higher than 500µs. Similarly,
for the inter-arrival time of 500 covert timing channel lengths, the detection can now occur at 5
buffering time. Hence, for the same inter-arrival time, the accuracy of detection is achieved at a
lower buffering time. Results of 6-bit case were not much different from the other two cases.
These are shown in Figure 3.9. Result indicates that the detection is still not possible for the
lowest inter-arrival time value of 100 covert timing channel length whereas the detection starts at
a buffering time of 100µs for an inter-arrival time of 250 covert timing channel length.

Figure 3.7 Detection percentage using 2-bit encoding scheme.
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Figure 3.8 Detection percentage using 4-bit encoding scheme.

Figure 3.9 Detection scheme using 6-bit encoding scheme.

e) Accuracy of detection of different covert channel lengths
In this experiment, we study the effect of the covert timing channel length on the
accuracy of the covert timing channel detection. Results are shown in Figures 3.10, 3.11, and
3.12. Figure 3.10 shows that the detection of covert channel is not possible at a covert timing
channel length of 100 inter-arrival times regardless of the buffering time and encoding bits being
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used. As we increase the covert timing channel length to 250, the detection becomes possible for
4 and 6 bit encoding at 100µs and 500µs buffering times, respectively. Similarly, a 250 covert
timing length allows the detection to take place at 20µs for 4 bit encoding dataset.
The rationale behind the observed results is that, as the covert timing channel length and
encoding bits increase, the probability of high buffering time follows it.

Figure 3.10 Detection of 100 covert timing channel length.

Figure 3.11 Detection on 250 covert timing channel length.
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Figure 3.12 Detection on 500 covert timing channel length.

C. Discussions
From the results, it is evident that MapReduce plays a key role in the efficient
exposition/detection of covert timing channels. Particularly, for large dataset sizes and
applications that require the timely detection of covert channels. In our previous work [14], we
developed the hierarchical entropy algorithm for the detection of covert channels. The work in
this paper focuses on efficient time scale detection of covert timing channels in a large dataset
which is analogous to exploration of a needle in haystack problem. The key metric in this regard
is quick and accurate detection of time scale of covert channel.
By using MapReduce with higher number of processors, we have shown that the
detection time can be within 600 seconds for a large dataset size of 1.4GB. This is a remarkable
improvement over the sequential implementation of the hierarchical entropy algorithm as well as
the MapReduce technique with lower number of processors. The reason behind this speed
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improvement is the division of data to multiple processors for execution instead of single
processor.
A key point to note here is that the division of data and use of multiple processors is
feasible when the data is huge. In this case, although there will be extra communication
overhead, it will result in quicker detection of covert timing channels. On the other hand, when
the data is relatively small, the use of extra processors does not provide any performance
enhancement; rather, it results in extra overhead reducing the detection efficiency.
We also analyzed the effect of encoding and inter-arrival times on the accuracy of the
detection of covert timing channels. Datasets that utilize more bits for encoding are easier to
detect. This is due to higher probability of buffering time in these datasets which in turn
improves the detection accuracy.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced the hierarchal entropy algorithm with MapReduce to detect a
needle of covert timing channels hidden in a haystack of overt channel. We generate a real
dataset of 1.4 gigabytes (i.e., overt channel) and hide 615 bytes of covert channel. Results show
that the accuracy of covert channel detection is increased with increased delay. Results also show
that the hierarchal entropy algorithm with MapReduce outperforms the classical hierarchal
entropy algorithm once the data size goes beyond 658 KB. Moreover, we discovered that higher
encoding datasets are easier to detect with greater accuracy.
Future work. Next, we plan to investigate the possibility to predict the number of
encoding bits in the covert timing channel through the use of machine learning techniques (e.g.,
using deep machine learning).
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CHAPTER 4
PAPER THREE: A STATISTICAL HIERARCHICAL ANALYSIS WITH
DEEP NEURAL NETWORK-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR
COVERT TIMING CHANNELS DETECTION
Abstract
Covert timing channel is an approach used to leak data between processes based on the
time between packets’ arrivals. The time based property makes the detection of the hidden
messages impossible by traditional security protecting mechanisms such as Proxies and firewalls.
This paper introduces a new generic hierarchical-based model to detect covert timing channels.
The detection process consists of the analysis of a set of statistical metrics at consecutive
hierarchical levels of the inter-arrival times streams. The statistical metrics considered are: mean,
median, standard deviation, entropy, Root of Average Mean Error (RAME). A real statistical
metrics timing channel dataset of covert and overt channel instances is created. The generated
dataset is set to be either flat where the statistical metrics are calculated on all streams of data or
hierarchal (5 levels of hierarchy were considered) where the statistical metrics are computed on
sub parts of the stream as well. Following this method, 5 different datasets were generated,
which were used to train/test a deep neural network based model. Performance results about
accuracy and model training time showed that the hierarchical approach outperforms the flat one
by 4 to 10 percent (in terms of accuracy) and was able to achieve short model training time (in
terms of seconds). When compared to the Support Vector Machine SVM classifier, the deep
neural network achieved a better accuracy level (about 2.3% to 12% depends on the used kernel)
and significantly shorter model training time (few seconds versus few 100’s of seconds). This
paper also explores the importance of the used metrics in each level of the detection process.
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Introduction
In network communications, covert channels are considered as a techniques used by
malicious entities to secretly pass information to other entities [32]. Depending on the hiding
methods, covert channels are classified as either storage based – where hiding methods consist of
altering protocol data units (payload or non-payload fields), or timing based – where hiding
methods consist of altering the packets inter-arrival times to hide secret messages [11, 13,44, 45].
Unfortunately, this type of illegal communication is not detectable by traditional security
mechanisms such as proxies and firewalls, making from the covert channels a serious threat
during the exchange of sensitive data; therefore urging the need to design sophisticated
protection techniques.
The research communities have categorized protection techniques into 2 broad
categories. A first category aiming at eliminating the covert channels, leading to degradation in
the network performance due to the reduction in the communication channels capacity, and a
second category of techniques aiming at detecting the covert channels [44, 45]. This research
work focuses on the latter category and uses statistical based approach to detect covert timing
channels.
In statistical based approaches, the covert channel detection is based on a stream of
packets inter-arrival times’ characteristics. These include: є-similarity, standard deviation, interarrival time distribution, mean, entropy, median, RAME [24, 2, 1]. All these existing statistical
based approaches follow a flat analysis, in the sense that all metrics are calculated on the entire
stream in a single-shot, then analysis will try to reveal whether the stream is covert or overt.
Following this process, in many case scenarios the flat approach fails to detect anomalies and
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hidden messages due to the lack of information inherent to the single-shot metric evaluation.
This is being illustrated in the following scenario.
Illustrative Scenario-1: Consider the following 2 sequences of inter-arrival times:
<covert_seq1> = <1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 8, 8, 8> and <overt_seq1> = <9, 3, 7, 4, 5, 6, 1, 7>. In this
scenario, <overt_seq1> is a random sequence with no pattern, however one can easily identify a
pattern in timing sequence of <covert_seq1> (<8, 8, 8, 8>). Assuming that the statistical metric
considered is the mean, with a flat based analysis, both sequences have the same mean (5.25)
making it impossible to differentiate between them and eventually fails to identify covert timing
channel. This leads to the first motivation behind our work.
Motivation_1: The need to overcome the shortcomings of the existing flat based
statistical techniques during the covert timing channels detection.
On the other side, machine learning has been widely used in problems with large amount
of data to analyze and identify hidden patterns. This makes it a perfect fit to solve the type of
problem we have in hand. In the literature, a vast majority of solutions to the covert channel
problem were supervised machine learning based, where statistical features (metrics) were
considered to detect patterns and anomalies. Classifiers methods are trained based on
covert/overt channel characteristics (attributes/features) and the performance of these methods
were measured with respect to the detection accuracy as well as their model training time.
SVM is among the classification techniques that were used in the covert timing channels
detection problem [2]. Though good accuracy results can be achieved with this method, the time
to build the classifier model from a large set of examples and the difficulty in defining/extracting
the set of features that will help in disambiguating the correct channel type (covert vs overt)
remain the main weakness of such shallow approach. Therefore considering deep learning
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techniques (with a representation learning capability) to solve the covert timing channel problem,
while not compromising the accuracy performance becomes a necessity. This leads to the second
motivation behind our work.
Motivation_2: The need to design efficient deep learning based model to overcome the
weaknesses witnessed in the performance of existing ones.
In this paper we propose a new model for covert timing channels detection (Figure 4.1). This
model aims at overcoming the weaknesses of existing statistical flat based analysis techniques
and SVM long model training time for large data application. The proposed model considers a
generic hierarchical based statistical analysis alongside with deep learning technique using deep
neural networks architecture as follows.
1.

Hierarchical based statistical analysis. This is a multi-scale analysis in the covert timing
channels detection process. Contrarily to the flat based analysis, we propose dividing our
data stream into a set of substreams on different hierarchical levels then compute the
statistical metrics on each substream (instead of the entire stream, which is the case of the
flat based approach) and select the substream that meets certain metric specific
criteria/rules. These steps are repeated recursively for each metric type and at each level.
For instance, in cases of mean, median, standard deviation, and RAME, substreams with
highest values are kept since they are most likely to contain covert timing channels,
however for entropy, the substream with lowest value is kept. Following these steps, a
real statistical metric-based timing channel dataset of covert and overt instances is created
based on recoding the inter-arrival times between packets and calculating the statistical
metrics for each inter-arrival times stream. These will be fed to the machine learning
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engine for classification. The next case scenario illustrates this process and shows how
the shortcoming of the flat based statistical analysis is being overcome.
2.

Illustrative Scenario-1 (revisited). Consider the same scenario presented earlier
(<covert_seq1> = <1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 8, 8, 8> and <overt_seq1> = <9, 3, 7, 4, 5, 6, 1, 7>).
Since the mean values of both sequences is the same (5.25), we consider dividing both
sequences into 2 subsequences (<1, 2, 3, 4> and <8, 8, 8, 8> for the covert sequence, and
<9, 3, 7, 4> and <5, 6, 1, 7> for the overt sequence) then compute the mean value for
each of the subsequence (2.5 and 8 for the covert subsequences and 5.75 and 4.75 for the
overt subsequences). Since we are considering the mean metric, the subsequence with
highest mean (<8, 8, 8, 8> for the covert sequence and <5, 6, 1, 7> for the overt
sequence) is kept for further computation and the other is discarded. The same process is
repeated recursively on the remaining subsequences leading to a distinct set of mean
values for both sequences ({5.25, 8, 8} for the covert sequence and {5.25, 5.75, 6} for the
overt sequence).

3.

Deep neural networks learning model. Because of the nature of our problem (large data
set, pattern recognition, poor prior knowledge of the feature space), we propose achieving
a higher detection rate by using deep neural network as a learning method alongside with
the hierarchical statistical based analysis. This should be achieved while not
compromising the model training time which was a major concern when using different
classification algorithms.
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Paper Contributions
This paper has the following contributions:
1.

Propose a new covert timing channel detection technique based on extended list of
statistical metrics for better detection accuracy.

2.

Adopt a new hierarchical based analysis during the detection process compared to
existing flat techniques.

3.

Construct a large dataset for the research community to experiment with. This dataset
comprises over 5 million entities, each with 25 attributes.

4.

Apply deep neural network learning technique along with the proposed hierarchical
analysis for improved covert channel detection rate.

Figure 4.1 Covert channels detection model.
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Literature Review
This section starts with a brief background about covert channel timing problem. Then
overviews statistical and machine learning based covert timing detection approaches. Finally,
highlights the surge of deep learning based approach in various application domains.
Covert Channel Overview
Covert Channels is one of the existing techniques used to hide and leak information
between communicating parties across networks [32]. During communication between a sender
and a receiver, channels can either be overt or covert. Overt channels transmit genuine data in
packet payload fields and are considered as safe. On the other side, covert channels attempt
transfer information between communicating parties in ways that conceal the fact that a
communication is taking place.
Based on the data hiding technique, covert channels can be classified in two broad
classes: (1) storage based channels – which relies on the protocol packet field to leak information
(through the modification of the non-payload field or through the modification of the payload
field), and (2) timing based channels – which consists of altering the timing intervals between
protocol packets to encode hidden data [44]. Timing channels are considered as complicated
techniques to use, but in return are harder to detect and/or eliminate. They can be further
categorized into 4 categories: inter-arrival time based, transmission rate based, protocol data unit
(PDU) based, and re-transmission based (retransmission of previously sent or received protocol
packets) [44].
Protection techniques for covert channels consist of either eliminating the covert channels
which will have a direct impact on the communication capacity or detecting the covert channels.
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In case of timing channels, most of the detection techniques consist of using statistical tests and
pattern recognition techniques to uncover covert traffic [26].
In the remaining part of this section we focus on the covert timing channel detection
techniques using statistical and machine learning based approaches.
Statistical Based Covert Timing Channel Detection Approaches
The statistical method takes advantage of the fact that covert timing channels generate
traffic with a few inter-arrival times characteristics.
The authors in [24] used a flat measure of the standard deviation metric to judge on the
existence of covert timing channels. High values of standard deviation are a strong indication
about the existence of covert timing channels and low values imply the absence of such channels.
On the other side, the authors in [26] used the entropy as a metric to detect covert timing
channels. Entropy pro-vides a significant evidence of the existence of patterns inside the data
signaling the presence of a covert channel with high probability. High entropy implies high
randomness in the data and absence of patterns, whereas low entropy implies the existence of a
particular consistency in the data indicating the high possibility of a covert channel occurrence.
In [25] the authors utilized two other metrics during the covert timing channel detection
process, these are variance and covariance. Both metrics measure the dispersion of the data. Low
dispersion is classified as safe, however high dispersion is a good evidence of the existence of
covert timing channels.
In [42] the authors used the entropy for detecting covert timing channels but in hierarchal
and different multi scale levels. They designed a hierarchal entropy algorithm which determines
the existence of covert timing channels in a stream of inter-arrival times and implemented a
testbed simulator for covert timing channels consisting of several stages. The process starts with
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en-coding the covert into arrival times at the sender side then the watching and recording of the
inter-arrival time at the receiver side, then finally, encoding them into the original message.
Results showed a significant ability in detecting covert timing channels using the hierarchal
entropy algorithm compared to applying flat entropy.
In [46] the authors proposed a techniques to speed the detection of covert timing channels
using the hierarchal entropy algorithm. They utilized MapReduce technique to parallelize the
detection of covert timing channels. They generated a massive dataset of inter-arrival times and
inject a covert timing message with different encoding types each time, then they sought the
location of this message within the dataset. The hierarchal entropy algorithm with MapReduce
demonstrated a high ability to detect covert timing messages in a reasonable time compared to
the case of sequential hierarchal entropy algorithm. In [47] the authors focused on statistical of
frequencies to detect covert timing channels. In our work we propose detecting the covert
channels using a statistical approach that considers the following hierarchical metrics (as
opposed to flat): mean, median, entropy, standard deviation, and RAME.
Machine Learning Based Covert Timing Channel Detection Approaches
Machine learning techniques have recently attracted a lot of attention due to their ability
in efficiently solving complex problems in various domains, in particular the detection of covert
timing channels where various statistical metrics (features) could be used by classifier models
and eventually be trained to distinguish covert channels.
In [48] the authors used a neural network based technique to accurately detect covert
channel. The authors in [49] proved that patterns in inter-packet timing channels can efficiently
be detected by the C4.5 decision tree algorithm trained on multiple features. C4.5 decision trees
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based algorithm has also proved its efficiency in detecting simple protocol switching channels
(Value Modulation pattern).
In [50] the authors designed an analyzer protocol to ex-tract features which are affected
with the existence of covert timing channels then they applied frequent pat-tern

mining

algorithms to produce association rules.
SVM classifier has been widely used in covert channel detection type of problems. The
authors in [51] demonstrated that simple covert channels encoded in network protocol packet
fields can be detected with high level of accuracy by Support Vector Machines (SVMs). Authors
in [2] designed a framework based on support vector machine to detect large varied types of
covert timing channels. In [51], authors focused on the efficiency of support vector machine in
detecting storage covert channels. They concentrated on these covert channels which utilize the
identiﬁcation ﬁeld of IP header and the sequence number ﬁeld of TCP header. The SVM shows a
strong ability to reveal the normal cases from abnormal cases. Despite its effectiveness during
data classification, the main problem with SVM remains with its timing complexity performance
in case of problems with large data property.
Deep Neural Network Application in Cyber Security
Deep neural network approaches have recently been adopted by researchers in various
domains due to their attractiveness in efficiently solving complex problems. In this section we
survey some of the application of deep learning in cyber-security related domains.
The authors in [52] used a deep learning approach for intrusion detection purposes. They
applied a deep neural network for the KDD cup dataset, which consists of a large number of
training samples. During the pre-processing phase, they transformed and normalized the data
before proceeding to the application of deep neural network. The deep neural networks output an
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efficient intrusion detection model, which was validated using three performance metrics
(accuracy, detection rate, and false alarm rate).
In [53], the authors proposed a new intrusion detection technique based on a deep neural
network in a network of vehicles. The proposed technique relies on the extraction of features
from the exchanged packets between the vehicle control units. The proposed solution consists of
training features offline and monitoring the exchanged packets to make real-time decisions and
eventually overcome possible attacks. Along the same line, the authors in [54] also used deep
neural networks for vehicle detection and classification. Results showed that the accuracy of
deep learning model improved as the time increases; an indication about the efficiency and
adapt-ability of deep learning based approaches.
Deep neural networks are also used in other application domains. Authors in [55] used a
deep neural network for the detection of high train speed faults. In [56] and [57], deep neural
networks were used in speech recognition and vehicle imaging with extreme lighting conditions,
respectively. In [58] the authors used deep neural network to extract features from videos. The
medical field is also another area where deep learning has tremendously been applied [59, 60].
Language recognition domain is also a domain where deep learning is playing a significant role
to solve complex related problems [61].
To summarize, deep learning has been applied in various domains where large datasets
are used to make predictions. Because of its characteristics, covert timing channel problem (with
its large dataset and the poor prior knowledge of its feature space) makes from deep neural
network a strong candidate to solve and achieve high performance results in terms of detection
accuracy and model training time. To the best of our knowledge deep neural network has not
been applied to this type of problems.
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In the next section we provide detailed description of the designed framework and the
methods used.
Covert Timing Channel Detection Framework Design
This section describes the details of the designed framework as well as the methods used
aiming at detecting the covert timing channels.
Framework Architecture
The proposed framework is made of three major blocks: (1) Raw data generation, (2)
Dataset construction, and (3) Training/Testing & Classification. Figure 4.2 shows a high level
abstraction of this architecture. The first block is responsible for generating a very large set of
inter-arrival times between 2 parties (sender and receiver) communicating across the network.
Without further processing, the generated data is fed to the next block for preprocessing and
statistical computation. During preprocessing, the stream of data is divided into substreams of
specific sizes. Then each sub-stream will be subject to statistical computations consisting of the
calculation of 5 different metrics meant to generate initial features which will be part of the
dataset which will be fed to the final block (deep neural network based) for training/testing
purposes and eventually covert timing channels classification (detection). In the rest of this
section we describe in details the process for covert timing channel detection.

Figure 4.2 High level representation of the detection framework.
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Covert Timing Channel Detection Process
Figure 4.3 shows the whole process for covert timing channel detection starting from the
raw data generation until the detection phase. The process starts with collecting a large stream of
data between a sender and receiver entities. The stream is then divided into small sub streams
each one has L inter-arrival times. The sub streams are then subject to statistical computation
using M statistical hierarchical algorithms. Each algorithm generates M features for each used
statistical metric. In this paper, we are using the following five metrics: mean, median, standard
deviation, entropy, RAME. Finally the dataset is fed to the deep neural network which trains the
model and tests the performance of that model.
Raw Data Generation
This phase consists of generating real covert timing channels between two personal
computers (Sender and Receiver). The setup consists of having two applications communicating
together over reliable TCP connections. A covert message is being encoded into a set of digits
(ranging from 1 to 4) and saved into a text file. Once the sender decides to send the covert
message, it picks up one of the encoded numbers then multiplies it by a constant d. The resulting
number represents the period of extra delay (in microseconds) to wait before being sent out. A
zero value read by the sender means that no extra delay is introduced and therefore no covert
message to be sent out.
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Figure 4.3 Covert timing channel detection process.
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Following this process, we ensure having a stream of covert and overt timing channels.
Figure 4.4 illustrates a case scenario of a covert timing message transfer between a sender and a
receiver. In this example, d is set to 50µs, the message to be transferred is “this is the covert
message.”

Figure 4.4 Covert timing message transfer example.

Dataset Generation: Preprocessing and Statistical Computation
The input of this phase is the stream of inter-arrival times generated following the data
transfer between the sender and receiver. During this phase, the raw stream is grouped into
substreams of fixed size L with 2 class labels (covert or overt). The overt sub-stream has 0
buffering time for all of its arrival times, however the covert substreams are characterized with
some extra delay as described in the raw data generation phase. Each of these substreams will
initially be used to compute the following 5 statistical metrics summarized in Table 4.1.
56

Following the initial computation, each substream is further divided using a dividing
factor K. In this work we opted for an even partition of substreams (K=2) (See Figure 4.5). This
step leads to two sub-streams of equal size. Both sub-streams will be subject to another round of
statistical computation with the five aforementioned metrics (cf. Table 4.1) leading to two
additional features for each of the 5 metrics. This constitutes the second level of hierarchical
computation. Before moving to the next level of hierarchy, a decision is made to prune/discard
one of the equal size substreams. Based on the type of metric being considered and the computed
values, the decision about which stream to keep is determined according to the following five
rules defined in Table 4.2. The same process is further repeated for the next level of hierarchy.
The final dataset that was generated in this work corresponds to 5 levels of hierarchy. Figure 4.5
shows the dividing process for determining the most area of substerams where the covert channel
is most likely to exist.
Algorithm Complexity
The complexity of such algorithm is O (M log ! 𝐿) where M is the number of metrics, K is
the dividing factor and L is the size of the inter-arrival stream.
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Table 4.1 Statistical metrics definitions
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Figure 4.5 Dividing process for determining the most suspected area of covert timing channel.

Rules Rationale
•

For the mean related rule, a high value suggests that a covert timing is more likely to
exist, because it means that there are some high value inter-arrival times contributing to
the overall high mean value.

•

For the median related rule, a high value suggests that a covert timing channel is more
likely to exist, because it means that there are some high value inter-arrival times
contributing to overall high median value.

•

For the standard deviation related rule, high dispersion in the values of inter-arrival times
suggests that a covert timing channel is more likely to exist.

•

The same applies to the RAME, where the higher values of some inter-arrival times a
higher error rate from the mean and make the sub stream more suspected to be covert.

•

The entropy case is a bit different to handle compared to the other four metrics. The first
difference is that we did a pre-processing phase before we calculate the entropy. The preprocessing consists of calculating the average of the n sub-streams and then replacing
each inter-arrival time with a unique number (i.e., we make it sequential in our case) if
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and only if the value of the inter-arrival is less than the average. If the value of the interarrival time is above the average, a value of zero replaces the value of inter-arrival time.
The entropy is calculated following this pre-processing phase. The second difference is
that we select the substream with the lowest entropy. This is the case, since the lowest
entropy gives a high indication of the availability of pattern within the sequence under
test. This pre-processing is represented in the pseudocode in Figure 4.6.
Table 4.2 Streams pruning rules definitions

60

Figure 4.6 Preprocessing phase pseudocode.

Following the pruning phase, the process is recursively repeated for each level.
Deep Learning and Classification
This is the final phase in our covert channel detection process. It consists of training a
deep neural network classifier as well as a Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm. The deep
neural network shows a high performance in predicting the class labels for very large dataset and
within reasonably model training time in comparison to other classification algorithms. Actually,
the last step of our detection process is to pass all the generated dataset which already have 2
class labels either covert or overt to the deep learning neural network.
Deep neural networks have the ability to be extremely efficient for large datasets in
comparison to traditional neural networks and other traditional classifiers such as SVM, Decision
Trees, Naïve Bayes, etc. Figure 4.7 shows the designed deep neural network. The proposed
model is composed of three standard layers:
1.

The input layers. Depending on the used dataset level, these inputs represent the 25
(resp. 20, 15, 10, 5) statistical features.
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2.

The hidden layers where each layer consists of a numbers of neurons (N) involved in the
prediction phase. Each neuron adjusts its weight based on the learning process and
participates in calculating the coefficients of the final equations which will be used to
determine the class label (covert or overt) of unseen instances.

3.

The output layer with the two class labels covert and overt. The output layer is the layer
which is responsible of determining the predicted value of the tuple either covert or overt.

Figure 4.7 Deep neural network.
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The following sections describe the experimental setup as well as the performance
results.
Experimental Setup
A. Inter-arrival times generation
Two applications installed on 2 PC’s (sender and receiver) are communicating together
over TCP connection. A covert message is encoded into numbers ranging between 1 and 4 and
saved into a text file. Once the sender decides to send the covert message, it picks one of the
encoded numbers and introduces a delay by multiplying each number by a constant set to 50. On
the receiver side, “Wireshark” network packet analyzer is used to monitor the received traffic. At
the end of this phase, a total stream size of 5,760,000 inter-arrival times was collected. We
propose posting our data to one of the existing machine learning online repository for the
research community to experiment and compare results.
B. Features generation
This phase splits the raw stream of 5,760,000 inter-arrival times (collected in the previous
phase) into sub-streams of size (L=64) thus generating a statistical dataset of 90,000 instances
with 2 class labels (covert or overt), where the overt sub-stream has 0 buffering time for all of its
arrival times, and the covert sub-stream has at least four inter-arrivals with buffering of 1, 2, 3 or
4 multiplied by 50 microseconds in the beginning of each sub-stream. Each of these sub-streams
will initially be used to compute the 5 statistical metrics (Entropy, Mean, Median, STD, and
RAME).
Following the initial computation, each of the 64 long size stream is divided by the
dividing factor (K=2) leading to two sub-streams of size 32. Both sub-streams will be subject to
another round of statistical computation using the same 5 metrics leading to two additional
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features for each of the 5 metrics. This constitutes the second level of hierarchical computation.
A decision is made to prune/discard one of the 32 long size streams based on the type of metric
and its corresponding pruning rule. The same process is repeated on the remaining 32 long size
stream.
In summary, each metric results in 5 features; the first one is the flat one and the other 4
features are the hierarchal ones. These hierarchal features are calculated on the 32, 16, 8 and 4
long size streams. With this approach we can get a dataset of 25 features and 1 binary class
attribute (covert vs overt). In fact, in the evaluation step, we generate 4 small datasets from the
overall large dataset where, in the small datasets we remove one level at a time until we reach the
flat level leading to 5 datasets: the first one is the hierarchal with 25 features, the second one is
the hierarchal with 20 features (the algorithm stops at the 8 long size sub-stream), the third one is
the hierarchal with 15 features (the algorithm stops at the 16 long size sub-stream), the fourth
one is the hierarchal with 10 features (the algorithm stops at the 32 long size sub-stream), the
fifth one is the hierarchal with 5 features corresponding to our reference flat level. Table 4.3
shows a summary of all parameters used in our experiments.
C. Deep learning setup
The well-known H2O package in R software is used during this step. A dataset of 90000
records is fed to the deep neural network with different configurations (i.e. number of layers).
60000 of the records are used for training and the other 30000 records are used for testing.
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Table 4.3 Experiment parameters

Dataset Description and Naming Convention
As stated in the previous section, the dataset generation phase resulted in the generation
of five different versions of datasets using a collection of the 5 statistical metrics (i.e., mean,
median, standard deviation, entropy, and root of average mean error). Each data set corresponds
to a certain level of hierarchical processing. We name our datasets as HiL5, HiL4, HiL3, HiL2,
and HiL1. Each dataset level is a subset of a higher level (for instance HiL4 ⊂ HiL5). HiL1 is the
reference (flat) dataset and has features generated from the 64 long size stream. HiL2
corresponds to the dataset generated using streams of sizes 64 and 32. Similarly, HiL3
corresponds to the dataset generated using streams of sizes 64, 32, 16. HiL4 corresponds to the
dataset generated using streams of sizes 64, 32, 16, and 8. HiL5 corresponds to the dataset
generated using streams of sizes 64, 32, 16, 8, and 4.
Performance Results
This section explores the results for the proposed covert channel detection approach. The
focus is on studying the accuracy of the proposed model and its training time. We also compare
the performance of our deep neural network based approach to that of SVM.
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Model Accuracy
A. Flat vs. hierarchical
In this experiment we collect accuracy results for two different configurations.
Configuration 1 consists of running the model with 3 hidden layers deep neural networks. Each
hidden layer has 6 neurons. In configuration 2, we opted for a strategy to determine a good
configuration in terms of the number of neurons. The strategy consists of summing the number
of features and the class attribute then divide the total by 2. This led to a sequence of 3, 6, 8, 11,
and 13 neurons as a good configuration setup for the flat, HiL2, HiL3, HiL4 and HiL5,
respectively.Results shown in Figure 4.8 show that for both configurations, better results are
obtained by using the hierarchal datasets (vs. the flat one). Accuracy increased with up to 4% for
configuration 1 and 7% for configuration 2. The charts also show that the accuracy improves as
the hierarchical level increases. Both results are due to the extra information that is being added
at each level enabling for better training of the neural network based model and eventually better
decision making. It is worth noting configuration 2 is indeed better configuration since it slightly
outperformed results obtained using configuration 1 for (HiL2, HiL3, HiL4 and HiL5).
B. Accuracy vs. the number of neurons inside the deep learning neural network
hidden layers
Figure 4.9 shows the effect of increasing the number of neurons inside the deep learning
neural network hidden layers (3 layers) for HiL5 dataset. Results suggest that the accuracy
improves as the number of neurons increases until it reaches a state (corresponding to 13
neurons) where the increase of the number of neurons is with no effect. In our case, the 13
neurons model achieves the highest accuracy with a ratio of 46% more compared to the 1 neuron
model case.
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Figure 4.8 Model accuracy for two different deep neural networks configurations.
Configuration1:(3 hidden layers, 6 neurons) and configuration 2:(3 hidden layers, 3 neurons for flat, 6
neurons for HiL2, 8 neurons for HiL3, 11 neurons for HiL4, 13 neurons for HiL5.

Figure 4.9 Effect of increasing the number of neurons in hidden layers.
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C. Accuracy vs. the number of neurons in a shallow neural network
Figure 4.10 shows the effect of increasing the number of neurons inside the shallow
learning neural network layers for HiL5 dataset. Results suggests that the accuracy improves as
the number of neurons increases until it reaches a certain value (for 15 neurons) where the
increase in the number of neurons has no effect on the performance. In our case, the 13 neurons
based model achieves the highest accuracy resulting in 4% increase compared to the 3 neurons
based model.

Figure 4.10 Effect of increasing the number of neurons inside the deep learning neural network layers
with respect to accuracy.

D. Accuracy vs. number of hidden layers
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of increasing the number of hidden layers for deep learning
neural network for HiL5 dataset. The figure shows that as the numbers of hidden layers increases
the accuracy also increases until it reaches a certain threshold where the increase of the number
of layers has no impact on the accuracy. In our case 5 layers model achieves the highest
significant accuracy with a ratio of 2% more compared to the 1 layer model. The reason behind
the degradation in performance in the accuracy is the over fitting problem where the prediction
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model will be well trained on the exact training data and hence losing the property of general
rules making from the model very efficient on the training data itself but not on the new tested
instances.

Figure 4.11 Effect of increasing the number of hidden layers for deep
accuracy.

learning neural network in

Deep Neural Networks vs. SVM
A. SVM vs. deep learning in terms of accuracy
Figure 4.12 compares the accuracy of SVM (with different kernels: Radial, Linear,
Polynomial of degree 2, and Polynomial of degree 3) and deep neural networks (5 hidden layers,
13 neurons/hidden layer). Results show that the deep neural network outperforms the Radial
SVM with 2.3% -12 % increase in accuracy. In the context of covert timing channels detection,
such an increase is very significant. The results are obtained on the HiL5 dataset.
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Figure 4.12 A comparison in terms of the accuracy between SVM (with different kernels: Radial,
linear, polynomial of degree 2, and polynomial of degree 3) and deep learning neural network.

B. SVM vs. deep learning in terms of model training time
Figure 4.13 shows a comparison in terms of the time to build the model between SVM
(with different kernels: Radial, Linear, Polynomial of degree 2, and Polynomial of degree 3) and
deep learning neural network. The result shows that 5 hidden layers deep learning neural
network with 13 neurons on each layer outperforms the Radial SVM with extremely significant
amount of time in comparison to SVM with all of its kernels.

Figure 4.13 A comparison in terms of the time to build the model between SVM (with different kernels:
Radial, Linear, Polynomial of degree 2, and Polynomial of degree 3) and deep learning neural
network.

The results are also obtained on the HiL5 dataset.
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The Importance of Metrics in the Detection Process
Table 4.4 shows the importance of the statistical features as well as the different
hierarchical levels in the covert channels detection process. Results in Table 4.4 highlight the
effect of the TOP10 features (among the 25 features used in the HiL5 dataset) on determining the
channel type. Results correspond to those obtained with a Deep Learning Neural Network with 5
hidden layers and 13 neurons in each layer. Deep neural networks follow the Gedeon algorithm
[62] for determining the importance of their inputs. Level-wise, results show that features
derived from the internal hierarchical levels participate in the detection of covert channels beside
the flat level. In fact, we can see that all levels (L1, L2, …, L5) appear in Table 4.4. The
hierarchical level 3 (L3) is slightly more contributing than other levels since it provides 4
features (Mean-L3, Median-L3, RAME-L3, STD-L3) among the TOP10 features.
Metric-wise, we can notice that all metrics appear in the TOP10 features except Entropy
(ranked 16). The Mean metric contributes a little bit more than other metrics as it appears 4 times
in the table. Results of Table 4.4 demonstrate the advantage of using the hierarchical analysis in
addition to the flat analysis since all levels and all metrics contribute to the overall accuracy of
the covert channel detection almost equally.
Table 4.5 shows the accuracy of Hierarchical vs. Flat for individual metrics. Results show
that the hierarchical analysis led to an improvement in accuracy when compared to the flat
analysis in all cases. The table also shows the contribution of each metric to accuracy
individually in both flat and hierarchical cases. Results also show that RAME metric achieves
the best accuracy comparing to the other metrics.
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Table 4.4 Top 10 features in terms of contribution to the detection accuracy

Feature (MetricLevel)

Contribution (%)

Mean-L1
Mean-L3
Mean-L2
Median-L3
RAME-L4
STD-L4
STD-L5
RAME-L3
Mean-L4
STD-L3

10%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%

Table 4.5 The accuracy hierarchical vs. flat for individual metrics

Metrics
RAME
Mean
Median
STD
Entropy
All metrics

Flat Accuracy
83%
89%
59%
83%
86%
93%

Hierarchical
Accuracy
95%
92%
67%
93%
91%
97%

Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show the confusion matrices of the Deep Neural Network (5
hidden layers and 13 neurons in each layer) trained on the hierarchal (HiL5) and flat dataset.
Note that covert testing cases are considered as the positive cases.
It is worth noting that the Accuracy is nothing but the ratio of the sum of true positive
(TP) and true negative (TN) testing cases to the total number of testing cases (i.e. P+N).
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the values of the above performance measures calculated from
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8.
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Table 4.6 The confusion matrix of the deep neural network on the flat dataset

Predicted

Actual class
label

Covert

Overt

Covert

13913

1059

Overt

1038

13990

Table 4.7 The confusion matrix of the deep neural network on the flat hierarchical (HiL5) dataset

Actual
class label

Predicted
Covert
Overt
14465
362
486
14687

Covert
Overt

Based on the confusion matrices we can derive many important performance measures.
These are presented and described in Table 4.8
Table 4.8 Performance measures definitions

Metric
Sensitivity

Specificity
Precision
F1-score

Description
Ratio of true positive testing cases (TP)
to the total number of testing cases
labeled positively (P). It is also known as
Recall
Ratio of true negative testing cases (TN)
to the number of testing cases labeled
negatively (N).
Ratio of true positive testing cases (TP)
to the sum of true positive (TP) and false
positive (FP) testing cases.
Harmonic mean of precision and
sensitivity: F1-score=2TP/2TP+FP+FN.
FN is the number of false negative
testing cases.

Table 4.9 Precision, recall and F1-score on the flat dataset

Precision

Recall

F1-score

Covert

0.930573

0.929268

0.92992

Overt

0.92963

0.930929

0.930279
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Table 4.10 Precision, recall and F1-score on the hierarchical (HiL5) dataset

Precision

Recall

F1-score

Covert

0.967494

0.975585

0.971523

Overt

0.975945

0.967969

0.971941

From the above tables, we can notice that the deep neural network shows a high Precision
and Recall values (and hence a high F1-score value) on both datasets. It is worth noting that the
≈ 4% increase in performance reported on the hierarchical dataset (HiL5) is very important in
critical applications such as the covert timing channel detection problem. Moreover, the high
values of both recall and precision mean that the deep neural network not only detects a very
high rate (≈97.55%) of testing covert channels but also it does with high precision (i.e. when it
classifies a channel as a covert channel, it is very likely (≈96.74%) that it is true).
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a new model for covert timing channels detection. This model aims
at overcoming the weaknesses of existing statistical flat based analysis techniques and SVM long
model training time for applications with large datasets. The proposed model considers a
hierarchical based statistical analysis alongside with deep learning technique using deep neural
network architecture. The model was tested by using 5 statistical metrics: mean, median,
standard deviation, entropy, and root average mean error and 5 levels of hierarchies. Experiments
were conducted on a dataset generated from a stream size of 5,760,000 inter-arrival times.
Simulation results show the following:
1.

The deep neural network trained on the hierarchal statistical dataset performs up to 4%
better than the one trained on the flat dataset in terms of accuracy. The reason behind the
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accuracy gained by the hierarchal analysis is the extra information added to the deep
neural network classifier for its training phase.
2.

Accuracy wise, the deep learning based model outperformed the SVM based approach (4
different kernels were considered - radial, linear, polynomial of degree 2, and polynomial
of degree 3) with an improvement ranging between 2.3% (against the radial kernel) and
12% (against the polynomial of degree 2).

3.

Under the same experimental setup in terms of datasets, the model training time of the
deep learning based model was far less compared to the SVM (few seconds compared to
few 100’s of seconds model training time).

4.

The model is sensitive to deep learning configuration parameters. This was manifested
when running the model with higher numbers of layers and neurons which improved the
accuracy with 2 to 5%. The increase in performance seemed to stop post 5 layers and 13
neurons. It is also worth noting that, as expected, the added layers and neurons slightly
increased the model training time due to the extra processing stages added to the model.

5.

All used metrics (except entropy) and all hierarchical levels contribute almost equally
well to the overall performance of the deep neural network in detecting covert channels.
Hence, we cannot get rid of some levels or some metrics in the proposed approach.
Regarding entropy, we can think about an alternative way to calculate it so that we can
also benefit from this popular information theory-based metric in our approach.
In our future work, we propose investigating and implementing new mitigation

techniques as countermeasures against the detected covert timing channels. We are also
considering augmenting our dataset by considering additional non-statistical features with the
goal of improving the covert timing channel detection rate.
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CHAPTER 5
PAPER FOUR: TOWARDS A STREAMING APPROACH TO THE MITIGATION OF
COVERT TIMING CHANNELS
Abstract
Leaking data using covert timing channels is considered as a critical threat in network
communication. These type of channels use the time between inter-arrival packets to pass
information between different processes, making it a very critical to design techniques to
eliminate and mitigate against such channels, hence ensuring a more secure communication
environment. This paper proposes a new online streaming approach to the mitigation of covert
timing channels. The new approach eliminates covert timing channels while having a little
impact on the overall Quality of Service (QoS). A classification-based strategy was used to test
the performance of the proposed mitigation model. In fact, we showed that the classification
accuracy of a classifier model trained and tested on a mitigated flow fell down to 50% compared
to the same classifier model when trained and tested on the same flow before mitigation
indicating that the classifier is no longer able to distinguish between covert and overt channels.
Introduction
Covert timing channels are considered as one of the most challengeable threats for
leaking data [32]. The importance of studying such type of channels rose up extensively and
rapidly because of the limitations of traditional techniques (such as proxies and firewalls) in
detecting these anomalies and eventually uncover such threats. Similar to any other security
related problem, the research community has tremendously explored covert timing channels by
either proposing new techniques to detect and uncover unwanted covert channels between
communicating parties or attempting to mitigate and eventually prevent the existence of hidden
messages. It is though worth noting that more focus was given to the detection of covert channels
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compared to attempting to mitigate them [44,45]. Techniques to mitigate covert channels need to
address the following 2 major challenges.
Challenge_1. Maintain a good compromise between the mitigated channels and the
overall Quality of Service (QoS).
Challenge_2. Assure that covert channels mitigation process happens on-the-fly in terms
of real time processing of stream of data.
This paper addresses the aforementioned challenges and provides a streaming solution to
mitigate covert timing channels using an on-the-fly cumulative statistical analysis. The designed
framework can be considered as conduit between the sender and the receiver processes. This
conduit operates by passing-through packets with low probability of covert timing channels
existence and trimming suspicious inter-arrival times up to a certain calculated threshold not to
affect the overall QoS.
The contribution of this paper is summarized in the following three main points:
1.

Propose an On-the-fly streaming analysis algorithm for mitigating covert timing
channels.

2.

Consider a cumulative statistical analysis towards the mitigation process.

3.

Maintain the highest possible QoS on the mitigated data stream.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview about the

literature related to the detection and mitigation of covert timing channels. Section 3 provides
details about the proposed covert timing mitigation approach. Performance results are presented
and discussed in section 4. Finally, in section 5 conclusions are drawn along with possible future
research directions.

77

Literature Review
Hiding data for leaking purposes can be classified into two main categories: (1) Storage
based; which is more concerned with the packet fields, and (2) Timing based which utilizes the
inter-arrival times as a vehicle for transmitting data [44].
Covert timing channels has been studied extensively by the research community. Most of
the proposed solutions focused on the detection of these type of malicious channels. However,
little work was conducted on mitigating these channels. In this section a brief overview about
covert channel detection approaches as well as mitigating techniques is presented.
Detection of Covert Timing Channels
In [50], the authors proposed a data mining framework for Covert Channel Detection and
Analysis System (CCDAS). Their approach is based on the combination of three detection
methods. The first method is based on feature recognition which focuses on building feature
database and finding the known features. The second method is called protocol analysis which
depends on using the RFC’s specifications of the well-known protocols in order to reassemble
them and thus reporting the abnormal behavior of the protocol to the decision engine. The third
method is responsible for detecting the abnormal behavior and is based on some statistical
methods.
In [2], the authors proposed a machine learning framework based on Support Vector
Machine (SVM) in order to detect the covert timing channel. This framework utilizes the traffic
to produce fingerprints which will be used as feature point for training stages for SVM and input
for the traffic classifications model. The classification model aims at classifying the traffic into
either covert or overt channel. The authors claim that the detection framework is capable of
classifying the covert timing channels in accurate and efficient manner.

78

The authors in [63] have followed a different approach compared to [51,2] by considering
the behavior of probability distribution for inter-arrival times to uncover covert timing channels.
The authors in [26] utilized the entropy metric to detect covered timing channels. Both
entropy and conditional entropy were used in the detection process. The authors noticed that the
existence of covert timing channels has a clear impact on the entropy indicating that any change
in the entropy on the original process can give a clear evidence on covert timing channels
existence. The higher the entropy, the lower the probability of covert timing channels. Their
results shows that this entropy-based approach can detect the covert timing channel with high
accuracy.
In [40] the authors proposed a model-based Covert Timing Channel (CTC) implemented
on skype traffic. The model takes into consideration many aspects, such as: the limitations on
buffering the packets by the sender in order to satisfy a maximum end-to-end delay, and
minimizing buffer overruns and underruns by partitioning multiple Inter-Packet Delay (m-IPD).
They argue that this model is not detectable by many statistical methods.
The authors in [24] focused on the standard deviation metric to detect covert timing
channels. The highest value of standard deviation is a good indication about the existence of
covert timing channels.
In [42], the authors used a hierarchal entropy analysis to detect covert timing. The authors
performed a different level of analysis on the inter-arrival times stream. The hierarchal approach
showed more ability to detect covert timing channels. An extension of this work was presented in
[46] where the authors proposed using MapReduce technique to improve the performance of the
hierarchal entropy algorithm.
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The authors in [64] integrate the packet filtering (firewall), Intrusion Detection System
(IDS), and covert timing channels detection in single system and they evaluate the integrated
system performance under different types of attacks.
In [65], a new TCP-based covert timing channel is suggested, which is called TCP-script.
This new technique uses the normal TCP data bursts to attach messages, and also uses the TCP’s
feedback and reliability services in order to achieve high decoding accuracy. The authors argue
that the TCP-script approach proves much higher increasing in channel capacity and decoding
accuracy in comparing with IP timing channel and JitterBug. They used three new metrics in
order to detect the TCP-script. These metrics are the deviation score for burst size, entropy of
burst size, and inter-ACK-data delay.
In [66] authors suggested a new detection technique for covert timing channels. This
technique depends on using cost-effective statistical methods in the detection process in which
the network traffic information is used. The statistical measures utilized in this approach exploits
three non-parametric statistical tests in order to categorize the covert and overt inter-packet
delays.
Mitigation of Covert Timing Channels
Several research papers dealt with the covert timing channel problem by proposing
techniques to mitigate these malicious channel. In [67] for instance, the authors designed a pump
to mitigate covert timing channels by adding a buffer in the middle between sender and receiver
and added noise to the buffered data. This approach applied to mitigate the covert timing channel
on the acknowledgment system between high user and low user. Despite the fact that the
proposed solution showed good performance in terms of the covert timing channels compared to
the unmitigated data, the authors did not address the effect the mitigation on the overall QoS.
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In [68] and [69] the authors explored the mitigation of covert timing channel which
resulted by scheduling virtual machines in cloud computing environment. Performance results
show a good balance between decreasing the probability of covert timing channels existence and
the high resource utilization. The following could be highlighted in their study. First, the
proposed solution is domain specific. It only focuses on cloud computing environment and
virtual machines scheduling. A more generic solution would be more suitable. Second, the
authors failed to address the impact of the mitigation on the overall QoS.
In [70], the authors designed a mitigation system for memory covert timing channels by
adding fake traffic if needed. The detection of covert timing channels was less than 1% after
mitigation. Unfortunately, the proposed solution is not generic; it is based on (ORAM) hardware
and focuses on memory based applications only.
The authors in [71] designed a predictive black box mitigation system by bounding the
source of inter-arrival times. Though this mitigation approach has decreased the amount of
leaked information, it fails to address the impact on the overall system quality.
The authors in [72] has expanded their work ([71]) by considering different environment. They
applied their solution in environments with multiple requests and responses such as web
applications systems. Performance wise this solution achieved similar results compared to their
previous work, however still luck from its specificity.
In [73] Authors have designed new languages and programming tools to bound and
mitigate covert timing channels. The authors suggest a cooperative model between hardware and
software to mitigate covert timing channel. Performance results show that the proposed language
based solution is much faster and was able to decrease the amount of leaked data. However this
solution is hardware and software dependent and therefore is not generic.
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Our coverage of previous research addressing mitigation of covert timing channels
showed that most of the existing work is either domain/application specific or fails to address the
impact of the mitigation of covert channels on the overall systems quality. In this paper, we
propose an alternative and more generic approach to mitigate the covert channels while
preserving good overall QoS.
Covert Timing Channel Mitigation Framework Design
This section provides the details of the mitigation framework including the methods we
are proposing in mitigating the covert timing channels. The mitigation process has two main
phases: (1) Flow selection and (2) Flow mitigation. These are described in the next subsections.
Flow Selection
This phase of the mitigation process is deemed important because of the resource
constraints in terms of server capacity and processing. In a typical scenario, the processing server
receives multiple flows of inter-arrival times which can only be processed and mitigated as one
flow at a time. Therefore, a main challenges consists of deciding about which flow to select and
mitigate among all incoming flows. We are proposing arranging flows based on their means and
standard deviations. Flow with the highest mean and standard deviation values as the most
suspected flow [64] and will be input to the second phase of this process: flow mitigation.
Flow Mitigation
The input of the mitigation process is a window of N inter-arrival times (selected during
the flow sections phase) and potentially having covert timing channels. This phase starts with the
computation of the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) of the inter-arrival times of the selected
stream. EMA is similar to a simple moving average, except that more focus (i.e. weight) is given
to the latest inter-arrival times in the current window size. By doing so, we ensure the accuracy
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and recency of the window mean. Similarly, the standard deviation for the same window is
calculated. During this process, the initial window (with no history) is treated as a special case
and will not be the subject of any trimming. The mean and standard deviation of the initial
window will serve as the starting point of the mitigation process of subsequent windows. In the
next step, the Upper_bound and the Lower_bound of the inter-arrival times of the window under
processing are calculated based on equations (1) and (2).
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝑀 + 𝐶 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝑇𝐷

(1)

𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝑀 − 𝐶 ∗ 𝑊𝑆𝑇𝐷

(2)

Where:
WEAM

is the Window’s Exponential Average Mean,

C

is the standard deviation Constant; and

WSTD

is the Window’s standard deviation.
All inter-arrival times will be checked against the lower_bound and the upper_bound; a

value that falls out of the [lower_bound .. upper_bound] range will be adjusted to match either
of the bounding interval. Following this inter-arrival times adjustment, the process proceeds with
the calculation of the new exponential average mean and standard deviation then adjusts the
upper and lower bounds accordingly. Fig. 5.2 shows an example of an inter-arrival data steam
before and after the mitigation process. The figure shows the adjustment made to the suspicious
inter-arrival times to fall within a specific range making it very difficult the leaking of data throw
the mitigated stream.
The full mitigation algorithm is captured in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Covert timing channels mitigation model.

Verification Process
The final phase of the proposed model is the verification of its efficiency and accuracy.
The verification process takes the mitigated flow of inter-arrival times as input and produces the
covert channel classification accuracy. The main idea behind this verification step is to apply
classification techniques on both streams (original and mitigated) and check if classifiers are still
able to detect covert timing channels on the mitigated dataset. The verification process is
depicted in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Verification model for mitigation algorithm.
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The verification process proceeds as follows. We start with a flow which already contains
a covert timing channel. This flow is divided into sub-flows (windows) of size N. Part of this
sub-flows are labeled as covert because we already know that they have a covert channel and the
remaining is labeled as overt. For each sub-flow, we calculate the mean and the standard
deviation of the inter-arrival times. Both metrics represent a tuple which will be grouped to form
a dataset of statistical metrics-based instances. The dataset will be used to train a classifier to
classify channels as covert or overt timing channels. In the next phase, the same flow will
undergo the proposed mitigation process. The mitigated flow is passed to the verification model
again to make sure that the classifier trained on the mitigated flow will not be able to detect
covert timing channels any more.
Let us denote by 𝐴𝑐𝑐! 𝑋 the accuracy of a classifier model X over a set of labeled
instances T. According to our mitigation process, instances that will form the set T will strongly
depend on the standard deviation constant parameter C. In fact, each instance 𝑡! ∈ 𝑇 corresponds
to the mean and standard deviation of the mitigated inter-arrival times of the different windows
which depend on C as explained in what follows.
When the standard deviation constant C is set to 0, all the mitigated inter-arrival times
values will have the same value (i.e. the average of the initial window). In this case, we will get
the worst QoS because there will be many changes on the inter-arrival times. On the other hand,
the classifier model X will not be able to distinguish between covert and overt channels for all
instances of the mitigated dataset T. The accuracy of the classifier would be the same as the
probability of tossing a fair coin.
The following equation could express the 0 standard deviation constant C case:
𝑙𝑖𝑚!→! 𝐴𝑐𝑐! 𝑋 = 50%

(3)
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Inputs:
S: online stream of inter-arrival times
N: number of inter-arrival times per window
C: standard deviation Constant
Output:
Mitigated S
Begin
Populate the window W with N inter-arrival times
WEMA = window_exponential_moving_average
(W);
WSTD = window_standard_deviation (W);
Upper_bound = WEMA + (C* WSTD)
Lower_bound = WEMA - (C* WSTD)
loop
Flush the current window W
Populate the window W with new N inter-arrival
times
for each Inter-arrival time I in W
if I > Upper_bound
I = Upper_bound
else_if I < lower_bound
I = lower bound
else
No change for I
end_if
end_for
WEAM = window_exponential_moving_average
(W);
WSTD = window_standard_deviation (W);
Upper_bound = WEAM + C* WSTD
Lower_bound = WEAM - C* WSTD
end_loop
end
Figure 5.3 Covert timing channels mitigation algorithm.

Let us denote by V the highest accuracy that we can obtain for a classifier model X
trained and tested on the unmitigated flow. V is going to be greater than 50% if the stream has a
clear covert timing channel. Now as the constant C goes with higher values, we will hit a value
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of C=C1 where the mitigation process becomes not useful at all. In fact, the accuracy of the
classifier model X on the dataset T (i.e. the dataset obtained from the mitigated flow) will be
equal to V. In other words, the accuracy of X will be the same before and after the mitigation
process. Hence, the mitigation is useless. However, this case represents the best case in terms of
quality of service since there will be no changes on the inter-arrival times.
The following equations could express the c1 standard deviation constant C case:
𝑙𝑖𝑚!→!! 𝐴𝑐𝑐! 𝑋 = 𝑉

(4)

Now for any Cn s.t. 0 < Cn < C1
𝑙𝑖𝑚!→!! 𝐴𝑐𝑐! 𝑋 = 𝑉𝑛

(5)

where 50% < 𝑉𝑛 < 𝑉
In this paper we used three well known classifiers, namely, J48 decision tree [74],
support vector machines (SVM) [75], and the naïve Bayes [76].
J48 is a Java implementation of the well-known C4.5 decision tree algorithm [Quinlann
Ref 93] which uses the gain ratio as a basis of its attribute selection measure. Attributes (i.e.
features) with high gain ratios have a higher discriminative power with respect to class labels and
consequently appear at top levels of the tree.
SVM are well-known category of binary classifiers which consist in finding the best
hyper-plane that can separate different classes (i.e. the hyper-plane that has the largest distance to
the nearest training instances belonging to any class).
Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic classifier which is based on Bayes’ theorem and which
assumes that all feature values are independent. Despite this naïve assumption, Naïve Bayes have
shown good and competitive classification performances.
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Performance Results
This section describes the results of the proposed covert channel mitigation approach.
Dataset Construction
To assess the performance of the mitigation approach, an overt and covert timing stream
of 250000 inter-arrival times was generated between two machines. The stream is divided into
sub-stream flows of 100 inter-arrival times each. The mean and the standard deviation of the
inter-arrival times within each window are then calculated and then assigned a class label: covert
or overt. Hence, a dataset of 2500 instances is generated in this way.
Classification Model Training and Testing: Prior and Post Mitigation
Classification models, namely, SVM, Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree (J48) models are
trained on the generated dataset. Then, the classification accuracy of each classifier model will
be reported. A 10-fold cross-validation testing strategy is used to assess the different classifiers
accuracies.
The same stream will then undergo the mitigation process with different standard
deviation constant values (C). Let us recall that C is used as a parameter that will be multiplied
by the standard deviation to bound the inter-arrival times and mitigate the covert timing channel.
The window size (N) for the experiments is set to 10 inter-arrival times. All mitigation process
parameter values are summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Mitigation system parameters

Parameter

Values

Covert timing delays

50, 100, 500, 1000 µs

Total # of inter-arrival times
250000
Standard deviation constant C 0, 1, 1.5, 2, 3 , 4.5, 6
Covert ratio / flow

0%, 10 %, 20 %
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A new dataset is generated from the mitigated stream following the same process
described in section A. New SVM, Naïve Bayes and Decision tree classer models are trained and
tested on the mitigated dataset using a 10-fold cross-validation testing strategy as well.
Figure 5.4 shows the effect of increasing the constant C on the prediction accuracy of the
different used classifiers. Results show that when the constant C increases, the classification
accuracy increases as well. By increasing C, we are augmenting the chance to leak data through
covert channels which are easily detectable by the used classifiers. The accuracy before the
mitigation process was 84%, 86% and 84% for the three classifiers SVM, J48, and Naïve base
respectively.

Figure 5.4 The effect of increasing constant value C on the prediction accuracy of different classifiers.

Figure 5.4 also shows that, for all used classifiers (SVM, Naïve Bayes and J48), when
C=1, there will be no more detectable covert timing channels in the stream and the accuracy is
almost 50%. Even though the purpose of the experiment here is not to compare classifiers, but
we will briefly explain why SVM and Naïve Bayes have better covert timing channels detection
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power than decision trees (when C > 1). The mitigation process will make the attribute values of
data instances labeled as covert timing channels quite similar to those labeled as overt.
Consequently, this will introduce inconsistency in the dataset and it is known that decision trees
are more sensitive to inconsistent data than SVM and Naïve Bayes.
Quality of Service Performance Criterion
In our experiments, we also considered a quality of service-based metric. This metric is
defined as the average change of the stream’s inter-arrival times during the mitigation process.
High values of this metric indicates a deterioration in the QoS
Figure 5.5 shows the effect of increasing C on the average change of inter-arrival times
during the mitigation process. Increasing C means that the inter-arrival values will not vary too
much comparing to the low value of C constant and because the mitigation bounds will also have
high values.

Figure 5.5 The effect of increasing constant value C on the average change of inter-arrival times.
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Figure 5.6 shows the effect of covert timing ratio on changing average for each interarrival time. Increasing the ratio of covert timing channel typically reflected to the changing
average for each inter-arrival time. The more is the ratio of covert timing channel in the stream,
means the more of high values of inter-arrival times and hence the mitigation will change more
in the inter-arrival time values.

Figure 5.6 The effect of stream covert timing ratio on the average change of inter-arrival times.

Figure 5.7 shows the effect of buffering time based on the designed covert timing
channel where the increasing of delaying time to encode specific data, it will directly affect the
changing average of the inter-arrival times, and that because the inter-arrival values time will be
also increased.
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Figure 5.7 The effect of buffering time on the average change of inter-arrival times.

Conclusion and Future Work
This paper demonstrates a steaming approach to mitigate covert timing channels in real
time. Our approach is intended to guarantee the absence of covert timing channels with the least
cost of affecting the stream quality of service. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our
solution, we study the ability of different classifiers to detect the covert timing channels before
the mitigation process and after the mitigation process and the results show that the accuracy
after mitigation dropped to 50% while it was 84%, 86% and 84% for the three classifiers SVM,
J48, and Naïve base respectively before the mitigation process.
In our future work we are looking to employ more parallel mechanisms to accelerate the
mitigation process and improve the model performance.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Conclusion
This research work explores the covert timing channels in terms of detection and
mitigation. Covert timing channel is defined as the utilization of packets inter-arrival times to
transmit unauthorized information.
In order to detect covert timing channels, we propose conducting a hierarchical entropy
analysis, where we explore different scales and levels using entropy metric instead of relying on
the flat level of data solely. This is considered as a kind of zooming in the inter-arrivals stream
instead of looking at the whole stream in a single pass. In order to verify the introduced
assumption, a simulator for covert timing channel was implemented and the algorithm was
applied to a stream size of 512000 inter- arrivals times. The hierarchical entropy analysis
algorithm shows an efficient ability of covert timing detection comparing to the flat entropy
analysis. It outperforms the flat entropy analysis by 10% in terms of accuracy.
The huge amount of data that can be generated in such type of problems and long
execution time of most of the developed techniques developed to solve these kind of problems
has motivated us to look for a mechanism to improve the performance of hierarchical entropy
analysis algorithm.

Therefore, we proposed using MapReduce technique to speed up the

detection process.

The proposed technique shows a significant and tangible speed up for

detecting covert timing channels comparing to the classical hierarchical entropy analysis. The
speed up of MapReduce algorithm starts clearly once the data size goes beyond 658 KB. To
verify the strength of this contribution, the simulation dataset is replaced with a real dataset of
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covert and overt timing channels and all of the experiments and results are conducted on this real
dataset.
Our next objective consists of developing a generic hierarchical model for the covert
channel timing detection. The proposed model is based on the following 5 statistical metrics:
entropy, mean, median, standard deviation, and root of average mean error as opposed to flat
model. The proposed model was further enhanced by embedding deep neural network to
efficiently handle our large dataset under investigation.
Simulation results showed that applying deep neural network on the hierarchical dataset
of metrics outperform that for flat metrics. It also outperforms the traditional machine learning
algorithms such as Support Vector Machines in terms of accuracy and time to build the
prediction model.
Our final proposed contribution consists of designing a new approach for mitigating
covert timing channels. The designed approach shows a high capability of eliminating covert
timing channels in the stream of inter-arrival times. At the same time, the designed solution
maintains the best possible degree of quality of service. In the mitigation process we will
determine the upper and the lower bounds of the inter-arrival times. If an inter-arrival time
exceeds them, we are going to set its value to these bounds.
Our experimental results are compelling and demonstrate the following:
1.

The simulation results show that the hierarchical entropy algorithm gives a high accurecy
for detecting covert timing channel with dataset encoded by 2 bit and 4 bit which around
96% and 84% respectively.

2.

By using MapReduce with higher number of processors, we have shown that the
detection time can be within 600 seconds for a large dataset size of 1.4GB. This is a
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remarkable improvement over the sequential implementation of the hierarchical entropy
algorithm as well as the MapReduce technique with lower number of processors. The
reason behind this speed improvement is the division of data to multiple processors for
execution instead of single processor.
3.

Results demonstrate the advantage of using the hierarchical analysis in addition to the flat
analysis since all levels and all metrics contribute to the overall accuracy of the covert
channel detection almost equally.

4.

The deep neural network trained on the hierarchal statistical dataset outperforms the flat
dataset in terms of accuracy by 4%. The reason behind that is the extra information added
to the deep neural network classifier in the training phase.

5.

The Deep learning based model outperforms the SVM based approach (4 different
kernels were considered - radial, linear, polynomial of degree 2, and polynomial of
degree 3) with accuracy ranging from 2.3% for radial kernel and 12% for the polynomial
of degree 2.

6.

The model training time of the deep learning based model was few seconds compared to
100’s of seconds for the SVM.

7.

In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our mitigation solution, we study the ability of
different classifiers to detect the covert timing channels before the mitigation process and
after the mitigation process and the results show that the accuracy after mitigation
dropped to 50% while it was 84%, 86% and 84% for the three classifiers SVM, J48, and
Naïve base respectively before the mitigation process.
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Future Work
Several extensions to this work are presently being considered. They include the
following:
1.

Build intelligent models for covert timing channels detection. The new model shall
consider a mixture of statistical and non-statistical features.

2.

Design more powerful mitigation approaches and attach them to real network security
systems such as firewalls and proxies.

3.

Improve the speed of mitigation process by designing parallel efficient solutions.

4.

Involve in other pattern recognition disciplines such as bioinformatics and image
processing. The ideas of pattern detection, which implemented in this dissertation could
be reflected in different science areas.

5.

Design other challengeable covert timing channels systems for ethical purposes helping
governmental agencies in their classified missions.
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